We investigate the relationship between the cost of procuring adequate worker effort over time and the shape of workers' experience-earnings profiles. In particular, we argue that the slope of the profile depends critically upon the degree of 'equity' held by workers in their enterprise as measured by the extent of performance related pay (PRP). The implication is that the slope of the profile for PRP workers falls between those of their zero-equity fixed wage, and one hundred per cent equity self-employed, counterparts. Our empirical analysis of three British data sets, namely the British Social Attitudes Survey, the British Household Panel Survey and the British Family Expenditure Survey, supports this prior.
I. Introduction
The relationship between the nature of the employment contract and worker productivity has long intrigued economists. Particular, but somewhat disjoint, emphasis has recently focused upon the implications of fixed wage, performance related pay (PRP), and self-employment (sic) contracts. The efficiency wage hypothesis, for example, has examined the notion that the firm's production costs might be inversely related to the level of pay and, in so doing, has proffered an explanation for equilibrium unemployment. 1 The analysis of self-employment has focused on its potential as a means of alleviating unemployment [Taylor (1996) , Bernhardt (1994 ), de Wit (1993 , Fujii and Hawley (1991) , Rees and Shah (1986) ]. Perhaps most controversial of all has been the academic and popular interest in PRP. Re-kindled by Weitzman's (1985 Weitzman's ( , 1987 purported macroeconomic benefits of profit sharing, attention has turned towards the more readily discernible, and originally lauded, microeconomic benefits of PRP schemes broadly defined [see Weitzman and Kruse (1990) , Blinder (1990) ].
We contribute to an improved understanding of these issues by focusing on the shape of the experience-earnings profile for workers employed under each type of contract. We follow Lazear (1979) in hypothesising that the slope of this profile reflects agency costs, and the reduction thereof, with increased agency costs inducing steeper profiles. The divergence of interests and asymmetry of information between principal and agent may cause output to depend upon the contingent nature of the compensation contract. If the costs of monitoring worker performance are excessive, firms may introduce compensation schemes, which encourage workers to self-select behaviour in the firms' interests. One method of doing this is to defer a substantial component of compensation until the later years of tenure. Such a wage profile would provide a penalty for shirking and thereby encourage workers to work efficiently over their employment-cycle. Intuitively, by paying younger workers less than their marginal product, and older workers conversely more, the firm is able to keep the present value of wages equal to the present value of productivity. This provides incentives to workers that would be absent if they were to be paid a wage that more closely followed productivity over their employment-cycle.
We therefore presume that the profiles of workers employed under fixed wage 'salaried' contracts are steeper than those of self-employed workers for whom the issue of agency does not arise. The interesting case is that of workers employed under a PRP contract.
If, as we propose, such contracts represent a hybrid between salaried and self-employment, then one would expect their experience-earnings profiles to lie somewhere between the two extreme cases. If such a hypothesis is correct then it casts new light on the nature of the experience-earnings profile, suggesting that the profile reflects agency costs, and the reduction thereof. Moreover, it may help to illuminate a hitherto neglected conduit for the transmission of productivity benefits under collective PRP schemes such as profit sharing:
ceteris paribus, the same experience-earnings profile would inspire relatively less shirking under a profit-sharing as compared to a salaried contract on account of the lower degree of agency considerations that must be overcome. Alternatively, the same degree of effort may be obtained from risk averse workers via a flatter, and therefore less expensive, earnings profile.
The nature of the profile has important implications for labour market behaviour. If the slope is primarily a reflection of human capital considerations, then it offers some clue as to the return to on-the-job training and educational investments. If agency considerations are paramount then it raises issues concerning the credibility of long-term employment contracts -firms may have an incentive to fire 'older' expensive, but no more productive, workers. A time-consistency problem may arise, with particular firms unable to recruit younger, less experienced applicants because of their inability to commit not to dismiss them in the future.
If the profile, however reflects training, such an incentive-compatibility problem will not arise -older workers will be more productive ceteris paribus. The nature of the earnings profile may also impinge upon quitting behaviour. More experienced 'generally' trained workers will have more manoeuvrability in the labour market than their otherwise similar 'firm-specifically' trained counterparts. But both types may have more options than those older workers whose market rents are primarily a reflection of agency considerations.
The paper is set out as follows: Section II reviews previous work into the nature of the experience-earnings profile. Our empirical investigations are set out in Sections III and IV whilst final comments are collected in Section V.
II. Background
The positive correlation between experience and earnings is one of the most robust and uncontentious findings in labour economics. 2 The source of the relationship, however, is somewhat opaque and in recent years two key theoretical explanations have emerged. 3 First, the general human capital model posits that workers become more productive, and hence better remunerated, on account of investments in human capital or training. Training investments can be either of a general, readily transferable variety or of a specific, nontransferable variety, both of which increase a worker's productivity over time in the current firm. The human capital thesis suggests that it is the return to this investment, with initial relatively low and subsequent relatively high real wages, which causes the earnings profile to have an upward slope [Becker (1975) , Ben-Porath (1967) , Mincer (1958 Mincer ( , 1974 ]. Wage growth is therefore equivalent to the return to investment in on-the-job training plus the change (i.e. reduction) in the investment from period to period minus any depreciation of the stock of human capital. Larger amounts of on-the-job training will result in steeper wage profiles.
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The second explanation is grounded in the theory of agency. It has long been observed that worker productivity is inexorably linked to the form of the compensation scheme [see Mitchell et al (1990) ]. From the early work of Johnson (1950) , Cheung (1969) and Ross (1973) , a recurring theme of this literature is that the divergence of interests and asymmetry of information between principal and agent cause output to depend upon the contingent nature of the compensation contract. The prohibitive cost of monitoring worker performance necessitates compensation schemes, which encourage workers to self-select behaviour the firm considers to be optimal. One method of doing this is to defer a substantial component of compensation until the later years of tenure. Such a wage profile provides a penalty for shirking and thereby encourages workers to work efficiently over their employment-cycle. Intuitively, by paying younger workers less than their marginal product, and older workers conversely more, the firm is able to keep the present value of wages equal to the present value of productivity. This provides incentives to workers that would be absent if they were to be paid a wage that more closely followed productivity over their employment-cycle. Essentially, steep profiles provide ex post rents that the worker is reluctant to lose. If reducing effort increases the probability of involuntary termination, then steep profiles increase the cost of shirking, thereby encouraging workers to raise their effort level, and in this sense represent a form of efficiency wage payment [Lazear (1979 [Lazear ( , 1981 ].
Much of the existing research testing the competing hypotheses considers whether or not wage increases are closely positively correlated with productivity increases [see, for example, Medoff and Abraham (1981) , Brown (1989) , Kotlikoff and Gokhale (1992) , Hellerstein and Neumark (1995) ]. 5 Some of the studies that have tested this relationship empirically, however, have found wage profiles to be steeper than measures of productivity growth. 6 Medoff and Abraham (1980) found that, within job categories wages tended to rise over time whilst supervisor performance evaluations (a proxy for productivity) were relatively flat. 7 Taking a somewhat different approach, Frank and Hutchens (1988) showed that, even in professions such as airline pilots and inter-city bus drivers where productivity would seem to be relatively static, workers receive wages that rise substantially with tenure.
Similar findings were obtained in an earlier study of 'accelerating obsolescence of older engineers' [Dalton and Thompson (1971) ]. Also consistent with the notion that wages rise faster than productivity is the finding of a so-called 'tenure effect' [Mincer and Jovanovic (1981) ] -the observation that wages within a firm rise relative to alternatives as job seniority rises.
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There are several reasons why wage growth might outstrip productivity growth.
Deferred compensation may deter shirking by raising the monetary consequences to a worker of being fired [Lazear (1981) ]. Alternatively, deferred wages may serve as a self-selection device to discourage workers with high quit propensities from joining the firm [Salop and Salop (1976) ]. Other explanations rely on the assumption that workers are more risk averse than the firm they work for [Harris and Holmstrom (1982) ] or that firms can earn a higher rate of return on assets than workers. In the latter view, firms invest a fraction of workers'
wages early in their careers and dole out the returns in the form of deferred wages.
An insightful method of discriminating between the human capital and agency explanation has been posited by Lazear and Moore (1984) who focus on empirical evidence regarding the relative 'flatness' of self-employed workers age-earnings profiles [Wolpin (1974) , Fuchs (1981) ]. Such a finding would seem to be problematic given that investment in physical capital depresses observed wages for the young self-employed, whilst the later returns to that investment raise observed wages. Both factors would tend to steepen experience earnings profiles for the self employed vis a vis wage and salary workers. Lazear and Moore (1984) rationalise this finding by highlighting the defining nature of self-employment, namely the duality of principal and ownership. Such an arrangement eliminates any disharmony of interests and so removes the necessity of engendering efficient effort over the life cycle through the use of a positively sloped wage profile. Observed profiles, argue Lazear and Moore (1984) , are a reflection of the disharmony of interests prevalent in the employment relation that are, by definition, absent from self-employment. By increasing the slope of the profile employers are able to induce their employees to work harder, therefore raising the present value of the latter's lifetime earnings. The self-employed require no such internal incentive mechanism and thus, may be used as a control to test the theoretical prediction that the shape of the experience-earnings profile is determined primarily by agency as opposed to human capital considerations.
In what follows we generalise Lazear and Moore's analysis by focusing not only on salaried and self-employed workers, but also on workers who receive some element of PRP.
Our presumption is that the employment contracts of all three worker types can be nested in the form:
where j = s, prp,se denotes 'salaried', 'PRP' and 'self-employment' employment respectively. w j denotes total remuneration, w the component of total remuneration that is 'fixed' (i.e. independent of worker performance), and ( )
some function mapping the relationship between worker performance (i.e. effort), e, 'uncertainty', θ and pay.
9 j λ represents the degree of equity held by a worker in his/her enterprise, viz. the proportion of total remuneration that is dependent upon performance. 10 We presume that 
Our presumption is that the shape of the experience-earnings profile depends critically upon λ j . To be sure, we presume that agency costs decline monotonically with λ j such that the slope of the PRP earnings profile falls between the zero-equity, fixed wage and one hundred per cent equity, self-employed profiles. 11 Hence, in this paper we essentially generalise the approach pioneered by Lazear and Moore (1984) in order to allow for the intermediate category of PRP, which enables us to further explore the agency explanation behind the positive slope of the experience-earnings profile.
IV. Data and Methodology

Data
Our empirical analysis draws on three British data sets vis. the British Social Attitudes Surveys 1985 , 1987 , 1993 , the British Household Panel Surveys 1991 -1999 We use data from the 1997-1998, 1998-1999, and 1999-2000 surveys. 14 Our subsample comprises working males aged between 18 and 65 who are either self-employed or employed under a fixed wage contract or a contract characterised by PRP. Those individuals classified as being employed under a PRP contract were those in receipt of a productivity linked bonus, profit-related pay, dividends from employee share ownership, an incentive bonus or a performance related bonus. Our sample consists of 8405 male respondents comprising 5965 fixed wage employees, 1201 PRP employees and 1239 self-employees.
It is apparent that there is some tension between our theoretical and empirical definitions of PRP. The former defines PRP as any contract in which current pay is related to current performance broadly defined. Some jobs reward performance with a promotion and/or a salary increment rather than with an explicit bonus. Moreover, some bonus schemes may also be used to identify 'fast-track' employees, and as such a revelatory component may be in operation as the employer learns more about a worker's skills and ability in the early years following an initial hire. 15 The BHPS, but not the BSAS or FES, asks specific questions relating to promotions and salary increments in each year, and we therefore augment our BHPS empirical analysis by including dummy variables to control for these factors.
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The empirical definitions of PRP in the three data sets are quite explicit. The BSAS and FES adopt a similarly broad definition that includes productivity-linked and discretionary bonuses, share ownership /options, and profit sharing. The BHPS focuses on just bonuses (type not defined) and profit sharing. 17 Which definition is more appropriate is largely a matter of interpretation, but our results are broadly consistent across the three data sets, and
were not found to be significantly affected by the exclusion of share option / ownership from the BSAS and FES definitions.
Full sample statistics for each of the data sets are set out in Tables 1 to 3 (all tables are presented in the Appendix). 18 A common finding in all three data sets is the relatively low earnings of self-employed respondents. The problems of accurately measuring selfemployment pay are well documented [see Eardley and Corden (1996) ]. What is important in our analysis, however, is the consistency in reported self-employment earnings. Since we are interested primarily in the slope of the experience-earnings profile, measurement error is not too problematic if self-employment income is consistently under-reported by respondents.
Methodology
Our analysis is based on a Mincerian earnings equation of the form:
where ijt w represents the hourly earnings of an individual i employed in employment type j at time t, with j = s, prp, se representing the three employment categories.
19 ijt Χ represents a vector of personal and workplace characteristics including education, occupational status and industrial affiliation, whilst ijt E denotes labour force experience at time t, proxied by the respondent's age at time t less his/her age when they completed full-time education.
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It is apparent that a first-best estimation of (5) would utilise a panel data source. We adopt such an approach with the BHPS sample which follows the same individuals across 1991 to 1999. In the case of the BSAS and FES analysis we are obliged to utilise pooled cross sectional data. This is not too problematic -if we assume that the vector of personal / workplace characteristics is stable across time then Χ ijt = Χ ij , ∀t , and the shape of the earnings profile may be calculated as:
There remain, however, two key problems with estimating earnings profiles from cross sectional data. First, the job matching hypothesis suggests that tenure will be relatively long, and earnings relatively high, where a good match has been struck between employer and employee [Jovanovic (1979) ]. The quality of any match will only become known over time and where job match quality is high it will be in the interests of both parties to maintain the employment contract. This may oblige the firm to pay a wage that minimises employee turnover such that high quality job matches exhibit both relatively high wages and relatively long tenures. Cross-sectional data, allowing only one point of observation in each match length, contains no information about the quality of a job match and may bias any estimates of returns to tenure.
In addition, estimation is further complicated on account of potential sample selection bias. Our earnings data derive from observing a particular employment contract (i.e. salaried, PRP, self-employment) and there may be variables that affect both the probability of observing such a contract and the return to any factors in the earnings equation. To take account of such considerations, we control for sample selection bias. Probit analysis with three discrete outcomes is used to model the determination of Z,
e. the probability of being in one of the three possible types of employment, which is then used to calculate the standard inverse mills ratio term, ijt δ :
where ijt P denotes the predicted probability of individual i at time t being employed under contract type j, ( ) . φ represents the probability density function of the standard normal distribution, and ( ) . Φ represents the cumulative density function of the standard normal distribution. By incorporating ijt δ into the wage regression, we are controlling for the fact that particular types of individuals are likely to be employed under specific types of employment contract.
To explore the robustness of our findings we experimented with three alternative measures of labour market experience. Firstly, for all three of our data sets, we estimated age- 
IV. Results
We estimate a standard quadratic Mincerian wage equation as depicted by equations (5) and (7). In the case of the cross-section data, we employ standard OLS techniques whilst in the case of the panel data derived from the BHPS we have employed a random effects estimator. 21 We have experimented with a number of combinations of explanatory variables as well as changes to our set of over-identifying instruments in the selectivity equation and we have found the regressions to be generally well specified and highly robust. 22 In general, our findings accord with the previous literature. For example, our results suggest a generally positive relationship between earnings and education as well as a concave relationship between earnings and experience. For brevity, we present in Tables 4 to 8 only one specification, which includes both educational certificates and years of education. 23 Table 4 presents the results relating to the pooled cross-section analysis of the BSAS whilst Table 5 presents the 1991-1999 panel data analysis of the BHPS. Finally, Table 6 presents the pooled cross-section analysis of the FES.
It is apparent from our three samples that the least robust regressions are those for self-employed respondents. This is not surprising. Such workers will not be motivated by
Mincerian type arguments to the same extent as their employed counterparts and, under an (extreme) argument whereby the earnings profile is a reflection of agency issues only, would not face the necessity of rewarding themselves with an upward sloping profile to ensure efficient effort over their life cycle.
The selectivity terms suggest that sample selection bias is negative in the BSAS (Tables 4 and 6 ), the three profiles are significantly different from one other at the oneper cent level of significance irrespective of the experience proxy used. In terms of the BHPS data (Table 5) , the three profiles are significantly different from one another at the one per cent level of significance when experience is proxied by age or job tenure, whilst the profiles associated with PRP and self-employment and fixed wage and self employment (but not fixed wage and PRP) are significantly different from each other at the one per cent level when experience is proxied by years in the labour force.
Our BHPS results also highlight the positive relationship between the dummy variable recording whether the respondent had been promoted in the current year (Promotion) and the earnings of fixed wage and PRP workers, and between the existence of incremental pay scales at the respondent's place of work (Annual Increment) and the earnings of PRP workers. We experimented with interacting Annual Increment and Promotion with the various experience proxies. These results confirm the validity of our findings regarding the experience-earnings profiles. 24 Moreover, in the case of the Promotion variable, they also cast additional light on the roles played by human capital and agency. Interacting the various experience proxies with Promotion suggested that the ordering of the three profiles was not affected by whether respondents had enjoyed a promotion in the current year. Indeed, we found that the difference in the three slopes (i.e. the agency effect) was actually more pronounced for those periods that fell in between promotions. Such findings support the argument that human capital may be more relevant to obtaining promotions whilst agency effects appear to operate primarily between promotions.
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Lambda as a Continuous Variable
The FES and the BHPS (1997) (1998) (1999) record the total amount of remuneration received in the form of the bonus. We are therefore able to proxy the size of the sharing coefficient, lambda.
To be sure, our theoretical priors specified expected remuneration under the general form of the employment contract as:
Thus total remuneration is split into a fixed and variable component, the division depending on the size of the sharing coefficient λ . We can proxy λ by calculating the ratio of bonus to total pay vis: 
Sample statistics for both the FES and BHPS samples relating to λ are set out in Table 7 .
Our prior is that a higher value of λ raises the expected cost of early-term shirking on the part of the worker and thereby leads to a flattening of his/her experience-earnings profile.
To investigate this empirically we ran three earnings regressions pooling the self-employed, the PRP employees and the fixed wage employees together for each of the two data sets, i.e.
the FES data and the BHPS data -see Tables 8 and 9 respectively. In the case of the FES, we conduct OLS analysis whilst in the case of the BHPS we adopt a random effects approach given that we are able to exploit the panel element to the data, i.e. we have information about the same individuals at potentially three different points in time. Once again, an unbalanced panel approach is adopted whereby the minimum (maximum) number of times an individual is in the sample is one (three).
Specification (1) illustrates that higher values of λ are associated with significantly lower earnings -this effect is probably reflecting the presence of self-employed workers within our sample. Specifications (2) and (3) focussed on the interaction between experience and the value of λ . Our results suggest that higher levels of sharing are indeed associated with a flattening of the experience-earnings profile. In the case of the FES, our findings suggest that as the coefficient of sharing moves from zero to unity, the annual rate of return (in terms of log hourly earnings) to an additional year of labour market experience falls from just under five percent to less than one per cent.
To summarise, our findings related to the proxy of λ provide further support for the hypothesis that the slope of the experience-earnings profile is influenced by both the presence and extent of PRP.
Training
Our results would seem to support the hypothesis that experience-earnings profiles do reflect agency considerations, with PRP profiles generally lying somewhere between salaried and self-employed profiles. Furthermore, we would argue that our findings are relatively robust given that we have used three different data sets (including both cross-section and panel data)
as well as exploring our theoretical priors via two different approaches and exploring alternative measures of experience. In addition, we would argue that the intuition related to the agency explanation behind the relative ranking of the slopes of the experience-earnings profiles is clear. However, it is also apparent that an alternative argument can be offered. It may be the case that PRP workers undertake relatively less training than their salaried counterparts, implying relatively high (low) starting (future) earnings, and thus flatter profiles. It is difficult to rationalise such an argument -it might seem that workers remunerated under PRP are, if anything, more likely to respond to investments in training than their salaried counterparts. To investigate this possibility we investigated the relative likelihood of salaried and PRP respondents having undertaken some form of training at their place of work. Two of our three data sets (BSAS and BHPS) contained information regarding whether respondents had received training within their firm.
The BSAS survey for 1987 asked respondents, in the two years preceding the survey interview, whether they had been: (i) asked to do anything just for practice in order to learn the work; (ii) given any special talks or lectures about the work; (iii) placed with more experienced people to see how the work should be done; (iv) sent around to different parts of the organisation to see how the work is done; (v) asked to read things to help learn about the work; (vi) taught or trained by anyone whilst actually doing the work; (vii) sent on any courses to introduce new methods of working. We created two variables -a dummy variable ('Train') which takes the value of one if the respondent answered 'yes' to any of these questions and an index ('Trains') which equals the number of these questions to which the respondent had answered 'yes' to the various types of training. Thus, 'Train' represents a binary dummy variable indicating whether or not an individual has received any training, whilst 'Trains' represents an index, which ranges from 0 to 7 indicating the number of types of training undertaken. We are therefore able to focus on both the incidence ('Train') and intensity of training ('Trains').
Participants in the BHPS were asked a somewhat less detailed question than their BSAS counterparts, simply whether in the preceding year they had participated in any off-thejob education or training. Relevant summary statistics for these variables for both data sets are set out in Table 10 . Given that our focus is on the incidence of training at relatively low levels of experience, we present summary statistics for four levels of experience. In the case of the BSAS sample, it appears that PRP employees do receive less training than their fixed wage counterparts. This finding may be taken as support for the evidence of a training effect.
The situation is reversed, however, at the lowest category of experience, which arguably is the focus of our attention. In the case of the BHPS samples, the support for the training explanation is less clear-cut with PRP employees, in general, being characterised by a higher incidence of training.
We explore the incidence and intensity of training across PRP and fixed wage employees by conducting probit analysis (dependent variable -Train) and ordered probit analysis (dependent variable -Trains). Our findings are set out in Table 11 . It is apparent that in the case of the BSAS, the PRP dummy variable has no effect on the probability that the respondent had so engaged in training. The probability of training was, however, significantly negatively related to the respondent's experience in the labour market, perhaps reflecting the fact that most training is undertaken by relatively younger workers. To ascertain whether there was any interaction between such experience and the PRP dummy we ran a second specification of the dichotomous and ordered probit models, this time including a series of experience-PRP interactions terms vis. 'Experience less than five years*PRP';
'Experience more than five years but less than ten years*PRP'; 'Experience more than ten years but less than twenty years*PRP'; 'Experience more than twenty years*PRP'. The coefficients on these terms were insignificant in the dichotomous probit but those on the last three were significantly negative in the ordered probit. Thus it does appear that more experienced workers receive relatively less training than their non-PRP counterparts, ceteris paribus. It should be noted, however, that we are primarily interested in the incidence of training at the lower level of experience.
We repeated this analysis for the BHPS sample. In the case of the panel data set, the results from employing a random effects probit estimator suggest that PRP employees are more likely to receive training, which provides evidence contrary to the training explanation.
Our results are therefore somewhat mixed and the BSAS findings allude to the possibility that differences in the earning-experience profile may not be driven solely by agency consideration. But these findings are not reflected in the BHPS data.
V. Final Comments
This paper has focused on the relationship between experience-earnings profiles and the degree of worker equity within an enterprise. We extend Lazear and Moore's (1984) thesis that the nature of the profile is primarily a reflection of agency considerations by focusing not only on those workers with zero or one hundred per cent equity (i.e. salaried and selfemployed workers respectively), but also on those with a fractional level of equity vis.
workers remunerated under some form of PRP. Our presumption is that these latter face an Our results might be interpreted as support for the argument that the shape of the experience-earnings profile is primarily a reflection of the costs of agency rather than of the accumulation of human capital through on-the-job training. As such, they highlight important issues pertaining to the credibility of long-term employment contracts, since employers may be tempted to replace experienced workers with less costly, but equally productive, novices.
But the latter will not remain 'young' forever, and whether they will be inclined to work for a firm that is unable to guarantee them employment in their dotage is an open question.
Moreover, our findings may help to illuminate a hitherto neglected conduit for the transmission of productivity benefits under collective PRP schemes such as profit sharing: if capital markets are imperfect then the same experience-earnings profile would inspire relatively less shirking under a profit-sharing as compared to a salaried contract on account of the lower degree of agency considerations that must be overcome. Alternatively, the same degree of effort may be obtained from risk averse workers via a flatter, and therefore less expensive, earnings profile.
Endnotes
1 See Akerlof and Yellen (1986) , Weiss (1991) and Carmichael (1990) for extensive reviews of the microeconomic foundations under-pinning efficiency wage models. 2 For an extensive survey of the literature see Polachek and Siebert (1992) . 3 Recent work in this area has emphasised the plausibility of other explanations. For example, search models generally predict that more time in the labour marker increases the chance of finding a better match and thus tends to be associated with higher earnings [Burdett (1978) , Ruhm (1991) , Jacobson and LaLonde (1993) , Manning (1997) ]. Alternatively, workers may prefer rising earnings profiles as a form of forced saving [Loewenstein and Sicherman (1991) , Frank and Hutchens (1993) ]. 4 The introduction of labour-fixed costs or firm specific human capital [Becker (1975) ] partially qualifies these predictions. Since investment in firm-specific human capital is assumed to be shared by the worker and the firm, the resulting wage profile will be flatter than the path of productivity such that wage profiles will be either equivalent to, or flatter than, productivity growth over the life cycle [Hashimoto and Yu (1980) ]. 5 Implications of specific human capital investment are ambiguous. Becker (1975) argues that such investment implies that wages grow slower than marginal products. Blinder (1981) and Carmichael (1983) , however, develop specific human capital models in which wages grow faster than marginal products. Some implications of the forced saving model are similar to those of Lazear's model, since workers are paid less than their marginal products when young and more when old. 6 Estimating the actual relationship between wages and productivity growth is problematic since productivity cannot in general be measured directly. Hence, most studies rely on indirect measures of productivity, limit the analysis to specific jobs, or ignore promotions and turnover. 7 This approach was later criticised by Weiss and Landau (1985) who argued that the correlation between wages and productivity within a job category would be attenuated if productivity were used as a criterion for promotion. 8 The tenure effect has been the focus of controversy. A number of economists have argued that the observed seniority premium is a statistical artefact [see, for example, Abraham and Farber (1987) , Altonji and Shakotko (1987) , Marshall and Zarkin (1987) ] whilst others have found the effect to be substantial and significant [see, for example, Topel (1990) ]. 9 Uncertainty may be related, for example, to conditions in the output market. 10 We assume in what follows that the extent of worker equity, as measured by λ , is exogenous being fixed by custom or government directive. This is obviously a simplistic assumption and a fuller exposition would seek to explain the distribution of different contractual arrangements. 11 Equation (3) defines PRP as any contract in which current pay is related to worker performance broadly defined. The practical operation of such schemes is certainly more nuanced -see, for example, Blinder (1990) , Booth and Frank (1999) . 12 Clearly, the four schemes are diverse in nature and as such create different incentives. Ideally, we would classify individuals according to the type of PRP scheme. Such an approach would be somewhat problematic, however, due to the low number of observations in each scheme. 13 In order to abstract from issues related to labour market participation, throughout our analysis we focus on male employees only. 14 Prior to this period the dataset had a slightly different structure and some of the variables required for our analysis are not available. 15 We are grateful to an anonymous referee for highlighting this point. 16 The specific questions are: Promotion -What was the date you started working in your present position? If you have been promoted or changed grades, please give me the date of that change. Otherwise please give me the date when you started doing the job you are doing now for your present employer; Annual Increment -Some people can normally expect their pay to rise every year by moving to the next point on the scale, as well as receiving negotiated pay rises. Are you paid on this type of incremental scale? Zero-one dummy variables were created from both of these questions -see Table 5 , Note 2 for details. 17 There is also some distinction between the BSAS / FES and BHPS definitions of self-employment. In the BSAS and FES, individuals are categorised according to the following question: 'In your main job, are you an employee or a selfemployee?' In the BHPS, individuals are asked to specify their current labour force status , with options including 'paidemployment', 'self-employment,' 'unemployed', 'retired', 'on maternity leave', 'in family care', 'full-time student', 'long term sick / disabled', 'on a government training schemes', 'other'. 18 A small number of individuals with more than one job, individuals employed by the armed forces and agricultural workers were excluded from the analysis of each data set. 19 The definition of hourly earnings differs across our three data sets according to the survey questions asked of respondents. For the BHPS, hourly earnings are defined as labour income in the previous month divided by the number of hours normally worked per month. For the BSAS, they are defined as the respondent's gross annual earnings divided by the number of hours the respondent works per week multiplied by 52. For the FES, hourly employed earnings are defined as the normal gross weekly wage divided by usual weekly hours whilst hourly self-employed earnings are defined as normal gross income from self-employment divided by usual weekly hours worked 20 Following Murphy and Welch (1990) , we also experimented with cubic and quartic experience terms -the results are available on request. 21 The fixed effects estimation results are available from the authors by request. 22 The over-identifying instruments for the underlying sample selection model included region of residence and a variety of demographic controls. The sample selection models, which were estimated using unordered probit analysis with three discrete outcomes, are generally well specified. For reasons of brevity, the sample selection results are not presented here, but are available from the authors on request. The results reported in Tables 4-6 have all been corrected for sample selection bias -uncorrected results are also available on request. 23 As pointed out by an anonymous referee, the shape of the earnings profiles may be influenced by trade union membership, unionisation of the work place, and employment in the public sector. Our results are robust to the inclusion of such controls. 24 The results are available on request. 25 We are grateful to an anonymous referee for highlighting such issues. British Social Attitudes Surveys 1985 , 1987 , 1993 , 1996 Fixed Wage (N = 1467 4: British Social Attitudes Survey 1985 , 1987 , 1993 , 1996 (24, 1442) 87.50 (24, 1442) 30.76 (22, 801) 64.80 (24, 758) 71.66 (24, 758) 17.22 (22, 335) 120.16 (24, 466) A Level, GCSE Grades below C, Other Qualification; 3. Occupation Dummies: Professional, Other Non Manual, Skilled Manual, Unskilled Manual; Industry Dummies: Energy, Metal Extraction, Metal Goods, Other Manufacturing, Construction, Distribution, Transport and Communications, Banking, Other Services. 4 (25, 5939) 33.48 (25, 1201) 35.88 (25, 1201) BSAS 1987 BHPS 1991 Ordered Probit (1) Probit (2) Ordered Probit (2) Probit (1) Probit (2 
